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SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY & THE NEW STANDARD OF CARE: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM, THE 
STATES, SOCIETY, AND THE MEDICAL COMMUNITY SERVE IN 
PAVING THE WAY FOR INCARCERATED TRANSGENDERED 
PERSONS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SEX CHANGE 
Victor J. Genchi* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Within the past couple of years, the United States has taken incredible bounds 
toward achieving equality for all citizens—particularly, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender (LGBT) community. For instance, the Supreme Court of the United 
States held same sex couples have a constitutional right to marry.1 Similarly, the 
transgender community in particular is in the national spotlight in part because of 
Olympic gold medalist Caitlyn Jenner’s decision to share her transition (male-to-
female) with the world.2 The nation’s overwhelming push toward unanimous 
embrace and acceptance of the LGBT community3 is evidence of our ever evolving 
society.4  
Similarly, the prison system in the United States is experiencing an evolution in 
the way it is required to care for transgender inmates.5 Gender dysphoria (GD) is a 
 ________________________  
 * Barry University School of Law Juris Doctor Candidate, Spring 2017. I would like to recognize and 
extend my sincerest appreciation to all members of Barry Law Review for their hard work and dedication in editing 
this article, to Professor Terri Day for sharing her unique perspective, and to my wife Kelly Genchi and our four 
wonderful children—the motivation behind everything I do in life.   
      1. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). 
 2. Austin Ramzy, Caitlyn Jenner Says She’ll Push for Acceptance of Transgender People, N.Y. TIMES (July 
16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/us/caitlyn-jenner-says-shell-push-for-tolerance-of-transgender-
people.html.  
 3. But see Danielle Weatherby, From Jack to Jill: Gender Expression As Protected Speech in the Modern 
Schoolhouse, 39 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 89, 128 (2015) (“While transgender individuals are becoming more 
prevalent in pop culture, transgender youth remain at risk, still plagued by high rates of violence.”). Additionally, 
see the Weatherby article for a comprehensive discussion on how gender expression—including bathroom use in 
public schools—should be protected speech under the First Amendment. Id. at 119–28.    
 4. See generally Alex Tribou & Keith Collins, This Is How Fast America Changes Its Mind, BLOOMBERG 
(June 26, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-pace-of-social-change/ (comparing the relatively rapid 
period of time American society and the legal system have taken in mandating a constitutional right to same-sex 
marriage with other civil rights milestones). For instance, only “[e]leven years after Massachusetts became the first 
state to allow same-sex couples to marry” in 2004, in 2015 the Supreme Court declared states cannot deny same-sex 
couples the right to marry. Id. In contrast, it took nineteen years after California struck down its ban on interracial 
marriage, in 1948, for the Supreme Court to rule in 1967 that states could not prohibit interracial marriage. Id.  
 5. See generally Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that a Wisconsin statute 
preventing Department of Corrections medical staff from providing hormone therapy to prisoners diagnosed with 
Gender Dysmorphia (GD) constituted deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution); South v. Gomez, No. CV-95-01070-DFL, 2000 WL 222611, at *1, 
*2 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 2000) (concluding that state corrections officers acted with deliberate indifference by abruptly 
terminating the provision of female hormone therapy to a prisoner diagnosed with GD). 
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term used to describe a medical condition characterized by an incongruence between 
one’s expressed gender and assigned sex at birth.6 Left untreated, people with GD 
experience anxiety, depression, suicidality, and other mental health issues.7 The 
World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) has promulgated 
Standards of Care (the SOCs), which describe the appropriate treatment for GD.8 In 
some instances, changes in gender expression and role, hormone therapy, and 
psychotherapy are a sufficient treatment; however, in severe cases, sexual 
reassignment surgery (SRS) is the only appropriate treatment.9 State prison systems 
have not—until recently—permitted inmates with GD who meet the SOC criteria to 
receive SRS.10 As a result, inmates have used the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution to allege state 
prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to their serious medical “need” for 
SRS.11 
In congruence with transgendered prisoner’s recent assertions of a medical need 
for SRS is the ever evolving non-originalist interpretation of the United States 
Constitution. Non-originalists believe the Constitution is a “living document” and 
judges should interpret it beyond the original intent of the Framers.12 Particularly, 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution’s prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishments is interpreted in this way.13 Moreover, in conformity with 
non-originalists’ views, judges look to contemporary standards when deciding cases 
involving governmental processes such as treatment of prisoners’ medical conditions 
while incarcerated.14 Contemporary standards are never fixed and will expand and 
contract with societal values.15 Chief Justice Warren stated: 
[C]ruel and unusual . . . the basic policy reflected in these words is 
firmly established in the Anglo-American tradition of criminal 
justice. The phrase in our Constitution was taken directly from the 
English Declaration of Rights of 1688, and the principle it represents 
can be traced back to the Magna Carta. The basic concept 
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity 
of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment 
 ________________________  
 6. Karl Bryant, Gender Dysphoria (GD), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/science/gender-dysphoria (last visted Oct. 1, 2016). 
 7. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 454, 457–
59 (5th ed. 2013). 
 8. See generally WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE 
HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE (7th Version 2011) 
[hereinafter SOC]. 
 9. Id. at 9–10, 54–55.  
 10. Paige St. John, In a First, California Agrees to Pay for Transgender Inmate’s Sex Reassignment, L.A. 
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-inmate-transgender-20150810-story.html. 
 11. See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 200 (D. Mass. 2012); see also Norsworthy v. Beard, 
87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 12. See Jack M. Balkin, Alive and Kicking, SLATE (Aug. 29, 2005), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2005/08/alive_and_kicking.single.html. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 
 15. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
2
Barry Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 5
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol22/iss1/5
Fall 2016 Sex Reassignment Surgery & the New Standard of Care 95 
 
stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of 
civilized standards. Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be 
imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any 
technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is 
constitutionally suspect . . . . [T]he words of the Amendment are not 
precise, and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw 
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.16 
These contemporary standards of interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause have evolved drastically over the past two 
centuries.17 Providing transgender prisoners with adequate medical care is now well 
within the Eighth Amendment’s purview. For instance, in Kosilek v. Spencer 
(Kosilek I) and Norsworthy v. Beard, two separate United States district courts 
granted the inmates’ requests for an injunction because they found SRS medically 
necessary and the Department of Corrections (DOC) acted with deliberate 
indifference when it denied SRS to WPATH qualified transgender prisoners.18 In 
Kosilek I, the earlier of the two cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit reversed because it found the DOC’s choice to provide non-surgical 
treatment such as hormones, electrolysis, and physiotherapy adequately treated 
GD.19 However, in the latter case, the California Governor released Norsworthy—a 
convicted murderer—on parole one day before the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit was set to hear the case.20 Following Norsworthy’s release, on 
August 10, 2015, the State of California became the first state in the nation to agree 
to pay for an inmate’s SRS.21 Inmate Shiloh Quine, who is spending life in prison 
for committing first-degree murder, will receive taxpayer-financed SRS.22 Post-
surgery, she will be housed in a female prison.23 
Part II of this comment embarks on a demonstration of the historical progression 
of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments case 
law. Next, Part III delves into the inherent problems interwoven into giving 
incarcerated GD sufferers SRS and how society, the states, and the medical field may 
have already resolved them. And finally, Part IV outlines why SRS will be a 
constitutionally protected right for prisoners with GD who qualify under the 
WPATH SOCs.   
 ________________________  
 16. Id. at 99–101 (emphasis added). 
 17. See generally Daniel Yves Hall, The Eighth Amendment, Prison Conditions and Social Context, 58 MO. 
L. REV. 207, 207–08 (1993) (detailing the history of the Eighth Amendment and how societal changes influence 
evolving interpretation).   
 18. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 237–38, 250–51 (D. Mass. 2012); Norsworthy v. Beard, 
87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1187, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  
 19. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 69–70, 96 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 20. Associated Press, Transgender California Inmate Seeking Sex Reassignment Surgery Freed from Prison 
After Parole, FOX NEWS (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/08/12/transgender-california-inmate-
seeking-sex-reassignment-surgery-freed-from/. 
 21. St. John, supra note 10. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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II. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF WHAT 
IS NOW THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD 
A. The Amendment 
At the conclusion of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia on September 
17, 1787, the citizens of the several states took the reins of their country’s future to 
ensure they would never again be subjected to a tyrannical aristocracy.24 The 
Constitution originally delineated necessary principles such as separation of 
powers.25 However, after ratification, the states demanded enumeration of individual 
rights.26 A constitutional amendment is not easily accomplished.27 However, James 
Madison judiciously distilled the states’ proposals for individual rights into sixteen 
suggested amendments.28 Madison introduced the proposed amendments to the First 
Congress in 1789.29 One of the amendments to be considered was the prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishments.30 It was met with little resistance from the Members 
of Congress.31 However, the House of Representatives’ “Mr. Smith, of South 
Carolina objected to the words ‘nor cruel and unusual punishments;’ the import of 
them being too indefinite.”32 Mr. Samuel Livermore, of New Hampshire, said that 
[t]he clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which 
account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning 
in it, I do not think it necessary . . . . No cruel and unusual 
punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a 
man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears 
cut off; but are we in future to be prevented from inflicting these 
punishments because they are cruel? If a more lenient mode of 
correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it could 
be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; 
but until we have some security that this will be done, we ought not 
 ________________________  
 24. See The Constitution, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/constitution (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2016) (discussing when the United States Constitution was drafted). 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id.  
 27. See Constitutional Amendment Process, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., 
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/constitution/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2016). To prevent arbitrary changes, the 
process for making amendments is rather difficult. See Mary Frances Berry, Amending the Constitution; How Hard 
It Is to Change, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/13/magazine/amending-the-
constitution-how-hard-it-is-to-change.html. Thus, an amendment may be proposed only by a two-thirds vote of both 
Houses of Congress or by a convention called by two-thirds of the states. Constitutional Amendment Process, supra 
note 27. The amendment must be ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures or three-fourths of the conventions 
called in each state for ratification. Id. 
 28. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 518 (4th ed. 2013). 
 29. See The Constitution, supra note 24. 
 30. See id.  
 31. See To Agree to the Senate Amendment to the Constitutional Amendment Resolution, Which Would Alter 
the 8th Article, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/1-1/h29 (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (illustrating 
that the amendment passed the House by a thirty-seven to fourteen margin in House Vote Number Twenty-Nine in 
1789). 
 32. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782 (1789).  
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to be restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of 
this kind.33 
Despite Mr. Smith’s objection, the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause became a part of the Constitution through the adoption of the 
Bill of Rights.34 Since 1789, however, the exact scope and meaning of this clause 
has been troubling for courts.35 The clause’s seemingly indefinite bounds expand as 
judicial interpretation conforms to an evolving society.36 
B. Judicial Development of the Deliberate Indifference Standard   
Chief Justice John Marshall’s pronouncement that “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” is as true today 
as it was in 1803.37 Therefore, the judiciary has the duty to interpret the Eighth 
Amendment so as to protect incarcerated persons from being subjected to cruel and 
unusual punishments. Early interpretation decided that “[p]unishments are cruel 
when they involve torture or a lingering death . . . [i]t implies . . . something inhuman 
and barbarous . . . .”38 What is considered “humane” and “inhumane,” however, is 
largely a function of public perceptions at the time the punishment was inflicted.39 
The doctrine of deliberate indifference developed through a series of cases 
brought by prisoners asserting their Eighth Amendment rights were violated by 
prison officials who refused to provide adequate medical care and treated them in a 
generally inhumane way.40 In 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States, in 
Estelle v. Gamble, established that prisoners have the constitutional right to adequate 
medical care.41 Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that  
 ________________________  
 33. Id. at 782–83.  
 34. See The Constitution, supra note 24. 
 35. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–100 (1958) (discussing the scope of the Eighth Amendment changes 
and that it has not been pinpointed by the Court).  
 36. See id. at 99 (discussing how the death penalty is still a widely accepted practice despite the fact that it 
has been used throughout history). 
 37. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); About the Supreme Court, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-
resources/about (last visited Jan. 23, 2017). 
 38. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (emphasis added). 
 39. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). The Court stated that “an assessment of contemporary 
values concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth Amendment . . 
. . [T]his assessment does not call for a subjective judgment. It requires, rather, that we look to objective indicia that 
reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction.” Id. 
 40. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 n.10 (1976) (citing Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 
1974) (doctor’s choosing the “easier and less efficacious treatment” of throwing away the prisoner’s ear and stitching 
the stump may be attributable to “deliberate indifference . . . rather than an exercise of professional judgment”); 
Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Thomas v. Cannon, 419 U.S. 879 (1974) 
(injection of penicillin with knowledge that prisoner was allergic, and refusal of doctor to treat allergic reaction); 
Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1973) (refusal of paramedic to provide treatment); Martinez v. Mancusi, 
443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971) (prison physician refuses to administer the prescribed 
pain killer and renders leg surgery unsuccessful by requiring prisoner to stand despite contrary instructions of 
surgeon)).  
 41. Id. at 103–05. 
5
: Sex Reassignment Surgery & the New Standard of Care
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2017
98 Barry Law Review Vol. 22, No. 1 
 
[a]n inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs 
. . . . In the worst cases, such a failure [to render medical care] may 
actually produce physical “torture or a lingering death” . . . . In less 
serious cases, denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering 
which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose.42 
Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners, the Court explained, 
is the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” which is “repugnant to the 
conscience of mankind” that the Eighth Amendment forbids.43 This indifference may 
be demonstrated by “prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by 
prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or 
intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.”44  Therefore, not every 
failure to provide medical care is an Eighth Amendment violation.45 Rather, there 
must be a component of intentionality behind the prison official’s actions.46  
The Supreme Court, in a series of subsequent cases, used the Estelle guideposts 
to flesh out what a prisoner is required to show to support an Eighth Amendment 
claim.47 The most comprehensive articulation regarding the application of the 
deliberate indifference standard was expounded in Farmer v. Brennan.48 In Farmer, 
the Court mandated that a prisoner is required to show a “substantial risk of serious 
harm” objectively exists and that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable 
state of mind, that is, “deliberate indifference” to a prisoner’s health or safety—
which is equivalent to criminal recklessness.49 Thus, deliberate indifference means 
subjective awareness.50 A prison official must: (1) know the underlying facts that 
give rise to an inference of a substantial risk of serious harm and must actually draw 
 ________________________  
 42. Id. at 103. 
 43. Id. at 104, 105 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173; Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 
471 (1947)).     
 44. Id. at 104–05. 
 45. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06 (“[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating 
a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical 
malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”); see also Farmer 
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994) (“[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health 
or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was 
not averted.”). 
 46. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05. 
 47. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seither, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (confirming that deliberate indifference inquiries 
require satisfaction of both an objective component—a “sufficiently serious” constitutional deprivation—as well as 
a subjective component—officials must act with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind”); see also Helling v. 
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993) (explaining that a prisoner may support the objective prong of the deliberate 
indifference inquiry by alleging and proving that he has been—or imminently will be—subjected to a substantial 
risk of serious harm). Furthermore, the prisoner must show that “the risk of which he complains is not one that 
today’s society chooses to tolerate.” Id. The Court further explained the subjective prong inquiry should be 
considered in light of the prison officials’ “current attitudes and conduct” while factoring in “arguments regarding 
the realities of prison administration.” Id. at 36, 37.    
 48. See generally Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835–39. Coincidentally, Farmer was a transgender inmate who, prior 
to her incarceration, had received breast implants and an unsuccessful, black-market testicular removal surgery. Id. 
at 829. The issue in the case was whether prison administration acted with deliberate indifference by housing Farmer 
in the general population where he was likely to be raped. Id. at 843.  
 49. Id. at 836.  
 50. Id. at 839–40. 
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that inference; and (2) must subsequently disregard the risk.51 It is not enough that a 
reasonable official under the circumstances would have known of the risk to the 
prisoner’s health or safety; the official must have actually known of, and disregarded, 
the risk.52 However, despite a substantial risk of serious harm, a good faith decision 
by officials based on legitimate penological concerns, such as safety, may be a 
countervailing factor when deciding the appropriate course of action.53  
1. Application of the Deliberate Indifference Standard to Treatment of a 
Prisoner’s Serious Medical Need  
While the jurisdictional jurisprudence may differ among federal circuits, the 
fundamental principle pertaining to medical treatment is consistent: the Eighth 
Amendment applies to both physical and mental “serious medical needs.”54 For a 
medical need to be “serious” it must be one that “has been diagnosed . . . as 
mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily 
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”55 While a lay person may readily 
recognize pain caused by a physical injury or illness, what is less apparent is the 
psychological impact a mental illness has on an individual.56 Therefore, courts 
routinely rely on a medical expert’s diagnosis to determine whether a serious mental 
illness exists.57 Once a prisoner has been diagnosed with GD, courts have found a 
serious medical need indeed does exist.58 However, the circuits that have addressed 
the issue of providing SRS to inmates with GD have been confronted with a barrage 
 ________________________  
 51. See id. at 837, 847. 
 52. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.        
 53. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1993) (describing factoring in “arguments regarding the 
realities of prison administration” in the deliberate indifference analysis); see also Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 
455 (1st Cir. 2011). In Battista, the court stated that 
[a]ny professional judgment that decides an issue involving conditions of confinement must 
embrace security and administration, and not merely medical judgments . . . . The 
administrators are responsible to the state and to the public for making professional judgments 
of their own, encompassing institutional concerns as well as individual welfare. Nothing in 
the Constitution mechanically gives controlling weight to one set of professional judgments.    
 
Id. (quoting Cameron v. Tomes, 990 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 1993)). But see Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511 
(2005). In Johnson, the court acknowledged that   
[t]he full protections of the eighth amendment most certainly remain in force [in prison]. The 
whole point of the amendment is to protect persons convicted of crimes . . . . Mechanical 
deference to the findings of state prison officials in the context of the eighth amendment 
would reduce that provision to a nullity in precisely the context where it is most necessary. 
 
Id. at 511 (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193–194 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
 54. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976). 
 55. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 
923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 56. NIH Curriculum Supplement Series [Internet], National Institutes of Health (US) (2007), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK20369/. 
 57. See Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Psychiatric Evidence on Trial, 56 SMU L.  Rev. 2191, 2195 (2003) 
(discussing routine legal cases in which mental health professionals consult). 
 58. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 81. 
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of differing expert opinions on whether SRS is a “medically necessary treatment” 
for GD.59   
a. Legally Recognized Diagnosis and Treatment Criteria for People with GD 
For people free from the confines of prison, discussions involving a person’s sex 
or gender are gradually becoming commonplace with the progression of society.60 
In the area of medical diagnosis, however, sex and gender are “highly controversial” 
and have evolved into a “proliferation of terms whose meanings vary over time and 
within and between disciplines.”61 For instance, GD has two connotations: (1) as 
general descriptive term that “refers to an individual’s affective/cognitive disconnect 
with the assigned gender”; and (2) as a diagnostic category that “refers to the distress 
that may accompany the incongruence between one’s experienced or expressed 
gender and one’s assigned gender.”62 Although one may meet the general descriptive 
definition of GD, many do not fit within the diagnostic category.63 People who have 
been diagnosed with GD may have become distressed due to the denial of “physical 
interventions by means of hormones and/or surgery.”64 People with GD “before 
 ________________________  
 59. See id. at 74–82; Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2015). In Kosilek, Dr. 
George Brown noted that the non-surgical treatments were helping, but to maintain these improvements that SRS 
was appropriate and medically necessary. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 74–75. Indeed, four separate experts agreed with Dr. 
Brown. Id. at 75–76. However, Dr. Schmidt, Dr. Osborne, and court-appointed expert Dr. Levine all opined that 
SRS was not medically necessary. Id. at 76–79. Each dissenting expert expressed concern over whether prisoners 
meet the real-life experience requirement of the SOC and stressed that SRS was an elective procedure. Id. at 73. In 
Norsworthy, Dr. Ettner and Dr. Gorton stressed that according to the SOC, SRS should be provided to any person 
with GD regardless of their institutional setting, and Norsworthy was needlessly suffering. Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 
3d at 1177–78. Dr. Levine argued prisoners should never receive SRS and stated that “legal advocates exaggerate 
the suffering of [GD] . . . through a misunderstanding of its nature.” Id. at 1179. 
 60. See, e.g., Ramzy, supra note 2. 
 61. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 7, at 451 (defining transgender as a broad term that describes a 
spectrum of individuals who persistently identify with a gender different than their natal gender). 
 62. Id.  
 63. See id. at 453. 
 64. Id. at 451–53. Medical professionals who follow the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders use the following factors when diagnosing a person with GD: 
A. A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and assigned 
gender, of at least 6 months’ duration, as manifested by at least two of the following: 
1) A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and primary and/or 
secondary sex characteristics . . . .  
2) A strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and/or secondary sex characteristics because of 
marked incongruence with ones experienced/expressed gender . . . .  
3) A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of the other gender. 
4) A strong desire to be of the other gender . . . . 
5) A strong desire to be treated as the other gender . . . . 
6) A strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of the other gender . . . . 
B. The condition is associated with clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning. 
Id. at 452. 
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gender reassignment are at increased risk for suicidal ideation, suicide attempts, and 
suicides.”65 However, even after gender reassignment, risk of suicide might persist.66  
Once diagnosed with GD, the WPATH SOCs outline the clinical approach 
healthcare professionals should follow to treat their patients.67 Incorporation of 
cutting edge clinical care, social developments, and political climates were all factors 
considered by the WPATH in creation of the SOCs.68 Furthermore, the SOCs apply 
in their entirety to all people diagnosed with GD regardless of their housing 
situation.69 Indeed, the SOCs specifically preempt any ambiguity by stating that 
“[p]eople should not be discriminated against in their access to appropriate health 
care based on where they live, including institutional environments such as 
prisons.”70 Therefore, treatment options should not be restrained merely because the 
patient is in prison. According to the SOCs, treatment for people diagnosed with GD 
does not necessarily require the provision of SRS.71 However, for people diagnosed 
with severe GD, SRS may be essential and even medically necessary because surgery 
is the only way to relieve their distress.72  
The SOCs set forth six eligibility conditions that must be met by patients prior 
to the provision of SRS: 
1) Persistent, well-documented gender dysphoria;  
2) Capacity to make a fully informed decision and to consent to 
treatment;  
3) Age of majority in a given country;  
4) If significant medical or mental health concerns are present, they 
must be well controlled; 
 ________________________  
 65. Id. at 454. (Gender reassignment usually indicates a legal change of gender.). 
 66. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 7, at 454. 
 67. See SOC, supra note 8, at 1. The WPATH is an  
international, multidisciplinary, professional association whose mission is to promote 
evidence-based care, education, research, advocacy, public policy, and respect for transgender 
health . . . . The overall goal of the SOC is to provide clinical guidance for health professionals 
to assist . . . transgender . . . people with safe and effective pathways to achieving lasting 
personal comfort with their gendered selves, in order to maximize their overall health, 
psychological well-being, and self-fulfillment. 
 
Id. 
 68. Id. (describing how WPATH is dedicated to fueling an evolution in health care through changes in public 
policy and legal reform).  
 69. Id. at 67. 
 70. Id. (explaining that “health care for [people diagnosed with GD] living in an institutional environment 
should mirror that which would be available to them if they were living in a noninstitutional setting”). 
 71. See id. at 8–9 (detailing that treatment for some people diagnosed with GD requires both hormone therapy 
and SRS as medically necessary, while for others one treatment or the other is sufficient, and still others do not need 
either). 
 72. SOC, supra note 8, at 54. 
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5) 12 continuous months of hormone therapy as appropriate to the 
patient’s gender goals (unless hormones are not clinically indicated 
for the individual); 
6) 12 continuous months of living in a gender role that is congruent 
with the patient’s identity.73 
Additionally, the SOCs require two referrals from qualified mental health 
professionals who have independently evaluated the patient.74 A qualified mental 
health professional, however, is not likely to be a part of a prison’s mental health 
staff.75 Accordingly, the proper procedure for prisons to follow is to retain outside 
consultants to treat GD prisoners.76 Finally, once the SOC conditions for SRS have 
been satisfied, the SOCs make it clear that “[d]enial of needed changes in gender 
role or access to treatments, including sex reassignment surgery, on the basis of 
residence in an institution are not reasonable accommodations . . . .”77 
b. Kosilek v. Spencer and Norsworthy v. Beard, Contradictory Federal Court 
Decisions with the Same Underlying Message: Given the Particular Facts and 
Circumstances Involved, SRS May Be a Medically Necessary Treatment for 
GD   
As the progression of medical diagnosis advances, litigants in medical disputes 
rely heavily upon expert testimony to prove their cases.78 Some argue that “[l]awyers 
need physicians to make their arguments in court persuasive and ‘true.’”79 As an 
initial matter, however, in both Kosilek I and Norsworthy, the DOC and the 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations (CDCR) did not dispute 
that the inmate’s diagnosis of GD constitutes a serious medical need requiring 
adequate medical care.80 Rather, the DOC and the CDCR argued that by providing 
Kosilek and Norsworthy with an alternative course of treatment such as 
psychotherapy, hormones, and the provision of female garb, that it indeed rendered 
constitutionally adequate care.81 Therefore, the issue regarding the objective prong 
 ________________________  
 73. Id. at 106. 
 74. Id. at 27. A “qualified” metal health professional is a person who possesses, among other recommended 
credentials, a master’s degree in clinical behavioral science, participates in continuing education pertaining to the 
diagnosis and treatment of GD, and maintains a cultural competence to facilitate his or her work with GD patients. 
Id. at 22. 
 75. See id. at 67–68. 
 76. Id. 
 77. SOC, supra note 8, at 68 (emphasis added). 
 78. See generally Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 225–27 (D. Mass. 2012) (noting that Plaintiff 
utilized numerous experts, both private and court-appointed, to prove that the DOC’s refusal to provide SRS 
constituted an Eighth Amendment violation). See Davoli, supra note 57. 
 79. PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED CARE ERA 28 
(2002). 
 80. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 86 (1st Cir. 2014); Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1187 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015).  
 81. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 76, 86; see generally Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1191 (discussing CDCR’s 
argument that SRS must be determined to be clinically necessary by an individualized review).   
10
Barry Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 5
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol22/iss1/5
Fall 2016 Sex Reassignment Surgery & the New Standard of Care 103 
 
of the Eighth Amendment analysis was whether SRS was a medically necessary 
treatment for prisoners diagnosed with GD who also met the WPATH SOC criteria 
that deems SRS medically necessary.82 But judges are not medical experts and 
should refrain from applying their own “non-medical” opinions.83 Thus, in reaching 
both of their decisions, the courts deciphered what constitutes medically necessary 
treatment with the assistance of expert testimony, which applied the SOCs to the 
facts and circumstances of each respective case.84 The courts then considered 
whether the DOC and the CDCR acted with deliberate indifference by denying 
SRS.85 
i. The Legal Labyrinth: Kosilek v. Spencer, Procedural Twists and Turns in 
the First Circuit 
To fully appreciate the extraordinary effort taken by the First Circuit to slow the 
natural progression of the legal and medical fields, it is necessary to walk through 
the peculiar events leading to its decision. In Kosilek I, the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts was the first federal court to order prison 
officials to provide SRS to an inmate.86 Judge Wolf’s lengthy opinion cited strong 
agreement with Kosilek’s expert witnesses’ opinions, which urged treatment should 
strictly comply with the SOCs, while dismissing the DOC’s expert’s alternative 
treatment approach as imprudent.87 Moreover, Judge Wolf held the DOC acted with 
deliberate indifference by denying Kosilek’s prescribed medically necessary SRS.88  
 ________________________  
 82. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 68; see Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1185. 
 83. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 88 (discussing an inference the district court in Kosilek used to deem the 
viewpoint of a physician as illegitimate). 
 84. See id. at 76–77; see Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1177–79. 
 85. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 206 (D. Mass. 2012).  
 86. Id. at 196, 251 (stating that “[t]his case is unusual because a transsexual prisoner . . . seeks an 
unprecedented court order requiring that the . . . [DOC] provide him with [SRS] to treat his major mental illness, 
severe [GD]”); see also Kari Huus, Sex-Change Surgery for Prison Inmate Granted by Judge, NBC NEWS (Sept. 4, 
2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/04/13660348-sex-change-surgery-for-prison-inmate-granted-
by-judge.  
 87. Kosilek, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 202. Judge Wolf stated in his Order:  
As the DOC doctors responsible for treating Kosilek and the experts who testified on 
Kosilek’s behalf credibly concluded, sex reassignment surgery is the only adequate treatment 
for Kosilek’s serious medical need. The DOC’s trial expert, Dr. Chester Schmidt, a 
psychiatrist from Johns Hopkins, proposed providing Kosilek with psychotherapy and 
antidepressants, rather than sex reassignment surgery. Dr. Schmidt’s recent work focuses 
primarily on medical billing procedures rather than treatment of gender identity disorders. Dr. 
Schmidt does not accept the Standards of Care . . . followed by prudent professionals. His 
approach to dealing with Kosilek’s condition would not be employed by prudent professionals 
in the community. 
Id. Also, while security concerns are relevant to the Eighth Amendment analysis, here, the DOC’s security concerns 
were found to be mere pretext for denying SRS that was “motivated by [the DOC’s fear of] . . . public and political 
controversy, criticism, scorn, and ridicule.” Id. at 203, 209. 
 88. Id. at 237. The DOC official’s knowledge of and indifference to a qualified physician attesting to the 
prospect of continued risk of serious harm to Kosilek’s health if SRS was not provided led the court to conclude that 
“[t]he evidence on the record clearly establishes that . . . [the DOC was] aware of facts from which they could infer 
that a substantial risk of serious harm to Kosilek existed, and drew the inference.” Id. Furthermore, since denying 
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision in its entirety.89 The court stated: 
In sum, where at least three eminently qualified doctors testify 
without objection, in accord with widely accepted, published 
standards, that Kosilek suffers from a life-threatening disorder that 
renders surgery medically necessary, and the factfinder is convinced 
by that testimony, we are at a loss to see how this court can properly 
overrule that finding of fact.90 
However, despite the panel’s reasoned determination, the First Circuit—in a rare and 
disfavored move91—granted the DOC’s petition for an en banc rehearing.92 Thus, 
the opinion affirming the grant of SRS was withdrawn, and the judgment was 
vacated.93 For the rehearing, the full circuit patched together law from other circuits 
and non-Eighth Amendment jurisprudence94 to formulate a highly contested,95 
“variable exactitude,” standard of review.96  
 ________________________  
SRS served no penological purpose, the continued exposure to the serious risk constituted deliberate indifference. 
Id. at 247. 
 89. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 740 F.3d 733, 773 (1st Cir. 2014). While the district court’s application of law 
was scrutinized under de novo review, the First Circuit gave great deference to the lower court’s finding of fact 
applying clear error review, holding that  
[t]he judge was well-placed to make the factual findings he made, and there is certainly 
evidentiary support for those findings. Those findings—that Kosilek has a serious medical 
need for the surgery, and that the DOC refuses to meet that need for pretextual reasons 
unsupported by legitimate penological considerations—mean that the DOC has violated 
Kosilek’s Eighth Amendment rights. The court did not err in granting Kosilek the injunctive 
relief she sought. 
Id. at 761–62, 772–73. 
 90. Id. at 766. 
 91. Hearing a case en banc empowers the full circuit court to overturn a decision rendered by a three-judge 
panel. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (“An en banc hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered 
unless: (1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (2) the 
proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.”) (emphasis added).  
 92. Kosilek, 740 F.3d 733 (order granting rehearing en banc).  
 93. Id.  
 94. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 84–85 (1st Cir. 2014) (utilizing case law from four different federal 
circuits, along with Fourth Amendment decisions, to explain that “an Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate 
medical care encompasses a multitude of questions that present elements both factual and legal,” which require a 
varying level of deference to the lower court’s factual findings).   
 95. Id. at 96–97 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s varying exactitude standard 
amounted to a sweeping de novo review of both fact and law that “[a]rmed [the majority] with the ability to take a 
fresh look at findings that clearly warranted deference . . . [it] easily steps into the trial judge’s shoes—the inarguable 
superiority of the judge’s ability to marshal facts, assess motive, and gauge credibility [were] all but forgotten”); see 
also Brief for Civil Procedure Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, Kosilek v. O’Brien, 2015 WL 
1776459 (2015) (No. 14-1120) (following the reversal by the en banc court, a group of legal scholars supported 
Kosilek’s petition to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, asserting that the First Circuit 
violated defining principals of the clearly erroneous standard of review, required by Rule 52, by applying de novo 
review to all of the district court’s findings); see FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral 
or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to 
the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”) (emphasis added).  
 96. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 84 (reasoning that review of mixed questions of law and fact is of variable 
exactitude, meaning the more grounded in law the question is, the less deference is given to the district court’s 
conclusions).  
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With the “degree-of-deference continuum” relegated to zero, and without 
witnessing live testimony, the First Circuit conducted an independent credibility 
assessment of the expert witnesses.97 The circuit court relied on the trial testimony 
of Dr. Levine, a medical expert appointed by the district court.98 Dr. Levine, who 
was the chairman of the committee that drafted the fifth version of the SOCs, testified 
that medical professionals can reasonably differ as to what the minimally adequate 
treatment for GD is.99 Running with that opinion, the circuit court quickly disposed 
of the district court’s finding that the DOC’s expert’s testimony was outside the 
realm of prudent medical treatment.100 A difference in medical opinions concerning 
treatment options, the circuit court reasoned, does not necessarily mean one opinion 
is imprudent.101 The circuit court held that the DOC’s choice between “one of two 
alternatives—both of which are reasonably commensurate with the medical 
standards of prudent professionals, and both of which provide Kosilek with a 
significant measure of relief—is a decision that does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment.”102 
Although there is much criticism concerning the circuit court’s decision to grant 
the en banc rehearing and the lack of deference given to the lower court’s findings, 
the prospect of SRS being a medically necessary treatment in prison was not legally 
barred. The circuit court stressed that  
this case presents unique circumstances; we are simply unconvinced 
that our decision on the record before us today will foreclose all 
litigants from successfully seeking SRS in the future. Certain facts 
in this particular record—including the medical providers’ non-
uniform opinions regarding the necessity of SRS, Kosilek’s criminal 
history, and the feasibility of postoperative housing—were 
important factors impacting the decision.103 
Thus, with the passage of time and the proper set of facts, the First Circuit will 
have no choice but to evolve with the medical field as SRS becomes more 
“uniformly” recognized as medically necessary.   
ii. Recognized SOC Rules the Day: Norsworthy v. Beard 
Norsworthy filed her first formal request for SRS less than two weeks after the 
decision in Kosilek I was released.104 She felt that “it was the first time an opportunity 
 ________________________  
 97. Id. at 84–85, 87–89. 
 98. Id. at 87–89. Dr. Levine was later retained by the CDCR as an expert regarding inmate requests for SRS 
in Norsworthy. See Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 99. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 227 (D. Mass. 2012); Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 88. 
 100. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 87–88. 
 101. Id. at 88. 
 102. Id. at 90. 
 103. Id. at 91. Also, the court explained that correctional administrators wishing to avoid treatment cannot 
seek out a single professional willing to attest that some well-accepted treatment is not necessary. Id. at 90 n.12. 
 104. Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1173–74 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
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was provided to transgenders that said the State had to listen to [her]” and that before 
then the thought of a formal request for SRS was “absurd” and “like ramming your 
head into a wall.”105 It was. Despite being armed with numerous doctor 
recommendations explicitly insisting that she receive SRS as a clinical and medical 
necessity, Norsworthy’s requests were repeatedly denied.106 Thus, she followed 
Kosilek’s lead by filing an Eighth Amendment claim in federal court.107  
In his opinion, Judge Jon Tigar of the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California wastes little time before giving credence to the 
WPATH SOCs.108 Specifically, he pounces on the opportunity to mirror the SOC 
treatment guidelines.109 He emphasizes that in some instances adequate treatment for 
GD can be non-surgical, however in more severe cases, relief from GD cannot be 
achieved without SRS.110 This principal of an individualized treatment for each 
prisoner’s specific ailments is consistent with the SOCs as well as Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.111 Thus, when the CDCR presented the testimony of Dr. 
Levine, who supported the CDCR’s blanket ban on the provision of SRS,112 the court 
swiftly labeled Norsworthy’s repeated denials an Eighth Amendment violation.113  
While the Ninth Circuit did not endorse the decision in Kosilek, it did adopt the 
First Circuit’s condemnation of an institution intentionally seeking out a medical 
provider for the sole purpose of overriding Norsworthy’s treating medical 
professional’s recommendation for SRS.114 The CDCR was ordered to promptly 
provide Norsworthy with her medically necessary SRS.115 The state filed an appeal, 
however, and the Governor of California released Norsworthy one day before the 
Ninth Circuit was set to hear the appeal, rendering the case moot.116   
III. THE INHERENT PROBLEMS WITH PROVIDING SRS TO PRISONERS WITH GD 
AND HOW SOCIETY, THE STATES, AND THE MEDICAL FIELD MAY HAVE 
ALREADY RESOLVED THEM 
As the above section illustrates, there are many tangential issues related to the 
core Eighth Amendment determination. The path in which society develops plays an 
integral role. Today, cultural advancements have spurred a national atmosphere of 
 ________________________  
 105. Id. at 1174. 
 106. Id. at 1173–74, 1176.  
 107. See id. at 1173, 1180–81. 
 108. Id. at 1170–71 (highlighting that the WPATH SOCs are recognized as authoritative by the American 
Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and the American Psychological Association). 
 109. See id. at 1187; see SOC, supra note 8, at 60. 
 110. Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1171. 
 111. Id. at 1170, 1191–92. (discussing prior cases where individualized treatments were requirements). 
 112. Id. at 1189 (discussing Dr. Levine’s negative view on SRS on those in custody). 
 113. Id. at 1193–94.  
 114. Id. at 1191–92.  
 115. Id. at 1195. 
 116. Associated Press, supra note 20; Paige St. John, Transgender Prison Inmate Seeking Sex-Reassignment 
Surgery Will Be Released, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-transgender-
prison-inmate-seeking-sex-change-will-be-paroled-20150807-story.html. 
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intolerance.117 Intolerance for inequality.118 The result has been what it has been 
throughout history—passionate advocates pushing the law up the steep hill of 
change. It is a struggle; change is hard, but with the assistance of out-of-court 
influences, the burden of change is lessened. 
A. A Sign of the Times: Societal Influences    
The culture in American society is shifting. For instance, recently a transgender 
high school student who was born male but identifies as a female fought against her 
school district for not permitting her to use the women’s locker room.119 The school 
district attempted to accommodate her by providing her with her own changing 
room;120 but separate is not equal.121 Thus, rather than risk losing millions in federal 
grant money, the district settled the claim and now allows access to locker rooms 
based on gender identity.122  
Another example of marked societal shift is in the world of sports. The 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) was the first athletic body to adopt a policy 
of inclusion regarding transgender athletes.123 The IOC’s policy specifies only those 
who have (1) undergone SRS; (2) had hormone treatments for at least two years; and 
(3) received legal recognition of their transitioned sex, can participate consistent with 
their gender identities.124 Recently, transgender students have also been permitted to 
participate in school sports in accordance with their gender identity.125   
Finally, the most significant step society has taken toward acknowledging SRS 
as a medically necessary treatment is its coverage under Medicare. In May 2014, 
SRS was de-classified as an “experimental treatment”; therefore, requests for 
transition related surgeries will be evaluated on an individual basis and covered if 
deemed medically necessary.126 In reaching its revolutionary decision, the 
Department of Health and Human Services’ Appeals Board consulted the WPATH 
SOCs.127      
 ________________________  
 117. See Jack Markell & Randi Weingarten, We All Have Role in Fight Against LGBT Discrimination, CNN 
(May 12, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/12/opinions/north-carolina-restroom-law-markell-weingarten/. 
 118. See generally id. 
 119. Duaa Eldeib, Transgender Student Who Fought District 211 Gets Locker Room Access, CHI. TRIBUNE 
(Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/schaumburg-hoffman-estates/news/ct-transgender-
student-deadline-district-211-met-20160114-story.html. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1952) (asserting that the separate but equal doctrine has no 
place in the realm of public education). 
 122. Eldeib, supra note 119.  
 123. Cathryn B. Lucas-Carr & Vikki Krane, What Is the T in LGBT? Supporting Transgender Athletes 
Through Sport Psychology, THE SPORT PSYCHOLOGIST 532, 541 (2011), 
http://www.humankinetics.com/acucustom/sitename/Documents/DocumentItem/06-Lucas-532-548.pdf. 
 124. Transsexual Athletes OK for Athens, CNN INTERNATIONAL (May 18, 2004), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/SPORT/05/17/olympics.transsexual/. 
 125. High School Policies for Transgender Student Athletes, TRANSATHLETE, 
http://www.transathlete.com/#!k-12/c4w2 (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). 
 126. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., DOCKET NO. A-13-87, DEPARTMENTAL APPEALS BOARD, NCD 
140.3, Transsexual Surgery (2014). 
 127. Id. at 7, 9–10.  
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B. The Influence of the Medical Field       
The incorporation of cultural advancement into the WPATH SOCs is just one 
example of how the medical field has raised the bar as to what is considered 
constitutionally adequate treatment for inmates diagnosed with GD.128 Further, a 
recent survey conducted of 137 medical schools teaching LGBT-related topics in the 
required curriculum, 30.3% reported to have instruction on gender transitioning, and 
34.8% reported to have instruction on SRS.129 Moreover, medical students are 
advocating for more required courses to keep up with transgender people’s health-
care needs.130 Consequently, medical experts versed in the WPATH SOCs will be 
more commonplace, and people—including those incarcerated—diagnosed with GD 
will be more likely to receive medically necessary SRS.   
C. State Contributions  
Recently, state prison systems have gotten into the habit of releasing transgender 
inmates who demand adequate medical care.131 This pattern of releasing inmates 
rather than providing them with adequate medical care cannot be permitted to 
continue. Each state must develop a comprehensive organizational scheme for 
dealing with transgender inmates. Thus, shortly after Norsworthy’s release, 
California adopted a policy for treating inmates with GD that closely conforms to 
the WPATH SOCs.132 Moreover, the policy indicates that post-operative transgender 
prisoners will be housed in a prison according to their gender identity.133 While 
California’s SRS and housing policy is in no way binding on other states, it certainly 
makes it easier for transgender inmates to point to California when their respective 
 ________________________  
 128. SOC, supra note 8, at 1 n.2 (“Version 7 represents a significant departure from previous versions. 
Changes in this version are based upon significant cultural shifts, advances in clinical knowledge, and appreciation 
of the many health care issues that can arise for transsexual, transgender, and gender nonconforming people beyond 
hormone therapy and surgery.”) (emphasis added).  
 129. Juno Obedin-Maliver et al., Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender–Related Content in 
Undergraduate Medical Education, JOURNAL OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N (Sept. 7, 2011), 
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1104294. 
 130. Tehreem Rehman, Physicians Must Not Lag Behind National Policy on Transgender Discrimination, IN-
TRAINING (Nov. 25, 2015), http://in-training.org/physicians-must-not-lag-behind-national-policy-transgender-
discrimination-10091. 
 131. See, e.g., Deborah Sontag, Transgender Inmate Who Sued Georgia Gets Unexpected Parole, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/01/us/transgender-inmate-who-sued-georgia-gets-unexpected-
parole.html (“[T]ransgender inmate who sued Georgia in February for access to hormone therapy and protection 
against prison rape, was unexpectedly paroled on Monday after serving less than a third of a 12-year sentence . . . 
.”); Diane Walker, Transgender Inmate Granted Parole, NBC12 (Jan. 25, 2014), 
http://www.nbc12.com/story/24466381/transgender-inmate-granted-parole (“A transgender Virginia prisoner, 
seeking sex change surgery paid for by the state, has been granted parole . . . after serving more than three decades 
of a 73-year prison sentence [for bank robbery, after] ‘no one in [her] family thought they would be living, when 
she walked free.’”). 
 132. See Richard Pérez-Peña, California Is First State to Adopt Sex Reassignment Surgery Policy for 
Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/22/us/california-is-first-state-to-adopt-
sex-reassignment-surgery-policy-for-prisoners.html; see SOC, supra note 8, at 54–68. 
 133. See James Queally, San Francisco Jails to House Transgender Inmates Based on Gender Preference, 
L.A.  TIMES (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-transgender-san-francisco-jails-
20150910-story.html (explaining that prison officials said that California can be a model for the nation to follow on 
how to safely house transgender prisoners).  
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state prison system denies prescribed medically necessary SRS on feasibility 
grounds.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
A brief look into the history of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause illustrates its seemingly “indefinite” bounds. Whether inmates 
with GD truly “suffer” the way the SOC indicates, I do not know. I am not a 
“qualified medical health professional.” Neither are the courts. Therefore, for Eighth 
Amendment claims alleging SRS is medically necessary, proper application of the 
deliberate indifference standard depends upon medical expert testimony. As our 
legal and medical fields evolve over time, cultural shifts influence both. The 
evolving standards of society will likely render imprudent any legal or medical 
professional who holds a view contrary to the recognized SOCs. Thus, for inmates 
with GD, SRS will be the new constitutional SOCs.  
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